ALL INDIA POWER ENGINEERS FEDERATION
Highlights of the Amendments
Key Issues and Analysis
PART A: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE AMENDMENTS
Context
There are three segments in the electricity sector: generation, transmission, and distribution. Generation is the process of producing power using different sources of energy. Then high voltage power is carried from the generation plants to the distribution sub-stations through a transmission grid. In the third segment, electricity is transferred from the sub-stations to individual consumers through a distribution network. In India, till 1975, all three segments were bundled together with the state owned electricity boards (or departments). In the early 90s, the generation segment was opened up to the private sector. In the late 90s, a few states such as Odisha and Haryana started restructuring their state electricity boards by segregating the three segments.[1] In 1998, Regulatory Commissions were established by law, at both the central and state levels, to regulate power tariffs.
The Electricity Act, 2003 is the central law regulating the electricity sector. The 2003 Act brought several changes in the sector such as (i) reorganisation of the state electricity boards, (ii) giving more powers to the regulators, (iii) setting up the Appellate Tribunal, (iv) providing for competition in transmission and distribution, (v) introducing power trading as a licensed activity, and (vi) seeking to eliminate cross-subsidies in the sector. The 2003 Act was amended in 2007 to allow for reduction of cross-subsidies instead of eliminating them.
Opening up generation to private sector participation has helped improve the power generation capacity in the country.[2] Generation capacity has increased from around 75 GW in 1991 to 347 GW in 2018. While the 2003 Act does not regulate renewable energy, the renewable capacity has also grown significantly in the last few years. As of November 2018, 21% of the total generation capacity in the country comes from renewable sources (72 GW).[3] However, competition in the transmission and distribution segments has been limited.2 Transmission lines are owned mostly by state companies (57%), followed by central (37%), and private (6%) companies.[4] Distribution is mostly carried out by state owned distribution companies (discoms). However, in cities such as Delhi and Mumbai, private entities also participate in the distribution business.2
The Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2014 was introduced in Lok Sabha in December 2014, and is pending consideration. The 2014 Bill seeks to: (i) increase competition in the sector by segregating the distribution segment into distribution and supply, (ii) rationalise tariff determination, and (iii) promote renewable energy.[5] The 2014 Bill was examined by the Standing Committee on Energy (Chair: Dr. Kirit Somaiya), which suggested certain changes to the Bill.[6] The Ministry of Power has proposed draft amendments based on the Committee’s recommendations and other stakeholder consultations.[7] We discuss these draft amendments below.
Key Features
Segregation of distribution network and retail supply of electricity
Purchase and sale of power
Tariff determination
Power subsidies
Renewable energy
Smart grid and metering
Composition of the SERC selection committee
Penalties
PART B: KEY ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
It is unclear how easily consumers can switch between suppliers
Under the Act, a distribution licensee maintains the distribution network and supplies electricity to retail consumers. The CERC/SERC may grant a licence to two or more persons for distribution of electricity through their own distribution system within the same area. The proposed amendments provide for separate licences for maintaining the distribution system (distribution licence) and for the supply of electricity (supply licence). Further, CERC/SERC may award multiple distribution and supply licences for a particular area.
The 2003 Act provides for multiple licensees to set up their own distribution network in the same area, thus allowing for competition. However, the electricity distribution segment has not seen much competition. Setting up a new network requires significant capital investment and hence acts as an entry barrier for new participants. Therefore, barring a few places in the country (such as Mumbai), most areas have one discom supplying electricity. The proposed amendments seek to enable competition in the supply segment by segregating the wire business from the supply business, and allowing for multiple supply licensees in an area of supply.
The rationale is that the consumer has the option to choose from (or switch between) multiple supply licensees. Each supply licensee will have an incentive to provide cheaper and better quality service to attract and retain customers. That is, suppliers will try to improve efficiencies as well as negotiate better prices for their PPAs and other costs, and pass on the benefits to consumers. For this to work, consumers should have the facility to easily switch from one supply licensee to another, if they wish to do so. Such switching should be smooth and the supply of power to the consumer should not be interrupted during such transition. The amendments do not explicitly provide for how such switching will work, and what will happen during the transition from one supplier to the other. Further, the amendments do not have an enabling clause that delegates the power to specify such details to the regulators (CERC, SERCs).
The Standing Committee on Energy that examined the 2014 Bill had suggested that the Bill should provide certain details regarding consumer switching between supply licensees.6 These include: (i) the mechanism for providing the consumer with the option to choose a supply licensee, and (ii) the transfer from one supplier to another based on the choice of the consumer, and the cost involved in such choice and transfer.
Power Purchase Agreements and trading of power
Supply licensees may not be able to engage in short-term trading
Currently, power is typically procured through Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) signed between the power plant (generation company) and the power distribution company (discom). The amendments provide that all purchase or sale of power to meet the annual average demand of power in an area will be done through long/medium/short term PPAs. This implies that discoms/supply companies will have to purchase all their power (for retail supply) only through PPAs. Considering that discoms/supply companies have to ensure 24x7 power supply to all consumers, one could question why they are not allowed to procure any power through ways other than PPAs (such as short term trading) to meet any unanticipated demand.
Under the amendments, the PPAs will be designed on the basis of the annual average demand of power. A supply company may engage in long and medium term PPAs to meet such annual average demand. Some variations in the average demand (seasonal over the year or variations based on time of day) can be met through short term PPAs. However, there could still be certain variations in the demand. Permitting short-term trading could help supply licensees fill the unanticipated demand.[8] Short-term trading could also help supply companies sell any surplus power resulting from lower than anticipated demand.8
Currently, trading of power takes place on power exchanges. Power exchanges are online platforms that help generators and consumers sell and buy electricity transparently, based on the demand-and-supply mechanism.[9] Prices on these exchanges are market determined. Power exchanges provide round-the-clock access to the electricity market. The NITI Aayog (2015) had noted that power exchanges provide for the needs of both buyers and sellers in the short-term.8 It had also noted that trading on exchanges can help meet the short-term needs of discoms arising from uncertainties in demand and supply.
Provision on trading by supply licensees is unclear
The amendments also provide that supply companies will not need a licence for trading in electricity. If all sale or purchase of power is to be done through PPAs, it is unclear what is the purpose of allowing supply licensees the power to trade without a licence.
Selection Committee for SERCs
The rationale for changing the SERC selection committee is unclear
Under the Act, the state government constitutes a selection committee for selecting members of a State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC). This selection committee is chaired by a person who has been a judge of the High Court. Other members include: (i) the Chief Secretary of the concerned state and (ii) the Chairperson of the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) or the Chairperson of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC). The draft amendments change the composition of the selection committee, and increases the number of members on it from three to six. The table below shows the current and proposed composition of the SERC selection committee.
Table 1: Composition of the SERC selection committee
Electricity Act, 2003 |
Draft amendments to the Electricity Act (2018) |
State |
|
High Court judge (Chair) |
Chief Secretary or the Power Secretary of the state |
Chief Secretary of the concerned state |
|
Centre |
|
Chairperson of the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), or the Chairperson of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) |
Serving judge of the Supreme Court (Chair) Union Power Secretary Union New and Renewable Energy Secretary |
|
Chairperson of the CEA |
|
Chairperson of the CERC |
Sources: Electricity Act, 2003; Draft amendments to Electricity Act, 2003; PRS.
The proposed SERC selection committee has only one representative from the state, and five from the centre. This raises a few questions. First, the rationale for reducing the number of representatives from states and increasing the number of representatives from centre on the selection committee for state regulators is not clear. Second, it is unclear why the selection committees for state regulators need to have five common members.
The rationale for having a judicial member on the selection committee is unclear
Currently, one of the members on the selection committees for SERCs is a person who has been a judge of the High Court. The amendments provide that the selection committees will be chaired by a serving judge of the Supreme Court. SERCs are executive bodies that regulate power tariffs, and regulate inter-state and intra-state matters in generation, transmission, trading,and distribution of power. The question is why does a selection committee of a regulatory body need to have judicial members. Note that, under the Act, the selection committee of the CERC does not have a judicial member on it.
Further, a serving judge of the Supreme Court will have to be on the selection committee of all 27 SERCs in the country. There may be several members retiring from SERCs throughout the year, and every year. This is not a part of the core role of the judge and will add to his/her work load. Note that as of May 2018, about 54,000 cases were pending in the Supreme Court, and between 2006 and 2018, pendency in the Court increased by 36%.[10] In such a situation, adding ancillary functions to the role of a Supreme Court judge may adversely affect the efficacy of the Court in its core role as the apex constitutional court.
Removing cross subsidies may increase subsidy burden on exchequer
Currently, consumers are charged different tariff rates based on their consumption category. State governments provide subsidies to most discoms to allow them to charge such differential tariff (from low paying consumers). In addition to these direct subsidies from the state governments, low paying consumers (agricultural and residential) are also cross subsidised by high paying consumers (commercial and industrial). In case of cross subsidies, subsidisation is inbuilt in the tariff. Such differential pricing and subsequent cross subsidising raises the input costs for manufacturing and service sectors.
The amendments provide that any subsidy to any category of consumer will be provided by the state or central government through direct benefit transfer (DBT). Further, the cross subsidisation within a distribution area will not exceed 20%, and will be progressively reduced and eliminated within three years. The CERC/SERC will have to ensure that the reduction in cross subsidy is not less than six percent in a year.
The cross subsidy for a consumer category is the difference between the cost to serve that category of consumers and the average tariff realised from that category of consumers.[11] Two possibilities may arise due to removal of such cross subsidy. First, it could increase the tariffs for the currently low paying consumers (agricultural and residential) who are being subsidised. Second, the state or central government may choose to alleviate any increase in their tariffs by giving them explicit subsidies through DBT. This could increase the subsidy burden on the exchequer (either through the Union budget or state budgets or a combination of both).
Recommendations of the Standing Committee
The Standing Committee on Energy had examined the Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2014, and submitted its report on May 7, 2015.6 Some of the recommendations of the Committee that have not been incorporated in the proposed amendments include:
[1]. Power Sector Reforms in Odisha: Major Issues and Challenges, Government of Odisha, April 2012, http://odisha.gov.in/e-magazine/Orissareview/2012/April/engpdf/53-62.pdf.
[2]. Introducing competition in retail electricity supply in India, Forum of Regulators, July 2013, http://forumofregulators.gov.in/Data/Reports/6_9_13.pdf.
[3]. All India Installed Capacity (in MW) of Power Stations, Central Electricity Authority, November 30, 2018, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/monthly/installedcapacity/2018/installed_capacity-11.pdf.
[4]. Growth in transmission sector, Ministry of Power, last accessed on September 30, 2015, http://powermin.nic.in/growth-transmission-sector.
[5]. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2014.
[6]. 4th Report: The Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2014, Standing Committee on Energy, May 7, 2015.
[7]. Draft amendments to Electricity Act, 2003 for stakeholder consultation, September 7, 2018, https://www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/bill_files/Draft%20Electricity%20Bill%202018.pdf.
[8]. “Report on India’s Renewable Electricity Roadmap 2030”, NITI Aayog, February 2015, http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/Report_on_India%27s_RE_Roadmap_2030-full_report-web.pdf.
[9]. 14th Report: Evaluation of role, performance and functioning of the Power Exchanges, Standing Committee on Energy, April 27, 2016.
[10]. Court News, 2006-2016, Supreme Court of India; Pendency of matters in Supreme Court of India, last accessed on October 22, 2018, https://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/statistics; Lok Sabha Starred Question 521, April 4, 2018, Lok Sabha.
[11]. “Report on Road Map for Reduction in Cross-Subsidy”, Forum of Regulators, April 2015, http://www.forumofregulators.gov.in/data/whatsnew/report.pdf.